Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley door pickup 10am - 7pm 3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Corporate Autonomy and Institutional Control: The Crown Corporation as a Problem in Organization Design

Corporate Autonomy and Institutional Control: The Crown Corporation as a Problem in Organization Design

Stevens, Douglas

Hardcover

Series: Canadian Public Administration, Book 18

Business GeneralManagement

Currently unavailable to order

ISBN10: 0773509003
ISBN13: 9780773509009
Publisher: McGill-Queen's University Press
Published: Jun 14 1993
Pages: 240
Language: English

Douglas Stevens believes that the balance between corporate autonomy and institutional control is a central issue in the management of Crown corporations. In Corporate Autonomy and Institutional Control he investigates the effects of various organization designs on this balance, taking into account the incentives and strategic behaviour of vote-maximizing politicians, influence-maximizing bureaucrats, and autonomy-maximizing managers.

Stevens examines institutional frameworks for Crown corporations in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba between the early 1970s and the mid 1980s, showing how each framework establishes different practices and offers distinct strategic advantages. Organizational approaches in Alberta most closely approximated what the author calls a self-contained design, in which corporate actors had the advantage and were most able to achieve their own objectives. In Manitoba, where vertical information systems prevailed, central bureaucratic monitoring agents tended, to some extent, to wield influence over the corporations. Saskatchewan practice was akin to a lateral relations pattern, with an equilibrium between corporate and bureaucratic goals.

Stevens's comparison of Crown corporation organization designs suggests that, while no one form is inherently more efficient than another, each leads to qualitatively different outcomes. He concludes that the most important issue in problems of organization design is who is winning the Crown corporation game -- a finding of considerable interest to all students of government enterprise.

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