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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Quine and the problem of logical identity

Quine and the problem of logical identity

Mlika, Hamdi

Paperback

Philosophy

ISBN10: 6209544363
ISBN13: 9786209544361
Publisher: Our Knowledge Publishing
Published: Feb 2 2026
Pages: 80
Weight: 0.26
Height: 0.19 Width: 6.00 Depth: 9.00
Language: English
It would not be wrong to say that Quine's entire philosophy of identity is diametrically opposed to Wittgenstein's point of view. Quine understands Wittgenstein's attitude as a regrettable misunderstanding. For Quine, we can justify the use of identity in our discourse by showing how the only identity statements that can be true without being sterile are, in Quine's own words in The Word and the Thing, those that contain different singular terms but refer to the same thing. For Quine, identity, expressed by the sign =, is a relational term that connects distinct occurrences of singular terms to form a statement. The resulting identity statement is said to be true if and only if its components refer to the same object. Identity is closely linked here to the division of reference, that is, to the acquisition of general terms. It can only function once these terms that divide their references have been acquired. The distinction between singular and general terms is decisive in Quine's behaviorist semantics and naturalistic epistemology.

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