Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley door pickup 10am - 7pm 3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Leveraging Logical Lines of Operation in COIN

Leveraging Logical Lines of Operation in COIN

Cody, Matthew J.

Paperback

General EducationGeneral Political ScienceMilitary Strategy

ISBN10: 1288287364
ISBN13: 9781288287369
Publisher: Biblioscholar
Published: Nov 12 2012
Pages: 78
Weight: 0.27
Height: 0.16 Width: 6.14 Depth: 9.21
Language: English

Historically, the U.S. Army faces numerous challenges planning for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Insurgencies by their very nature occur within the context of a complex operating environment that typically last years if not decades. The insurgency that erupted at the conclusion of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom represents an example of the complex operating environment that planners will continue to face in the future. The best available planning method for operational planners to frame operations over the duration of a protracted campaign is called logical lines of operation. Logical lines of operation provide a method for commanders to visualize and adjust operations over time, space and purpose to contribute to operational objectives and strategic end-state(s). This monograph analyzes the theoretical and historical underpinnings of lines of operation (physical and logical) as well as counterinsurgency operations. Subsequently, an analysis and assessment of both U.S. and British planning and counterinsurgency doctrine provides a look at the effectiveness of current doctrine in addressing the use of logical lines of operation in the complex operating environment. Case studies are analyzed to examine the practical application of logical lines of operation in COIN operations and subsequently determine whether the concept informs current doctrine. The monograph argues that a void exists in both U.S. Army and Joint doctrine with respect to the use of logical lines of operation-particularly with respect to planning COIN operations within protracted campaigns. Consequently, the monograph makes the following recommendations to improve the description and depiction of logical lines of operation in U.S. Joint and Army planning and counterinsurgency doctrine. First, operationalize counterinsurgency doctrine by including logical lines of operation as a planning framework. Second, clarify language and terminology across current joint and army doct

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