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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements

Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements

Ferrari, Filippo

Hardcover

Series: Philosophy of Language: Connections and Perspectives

PhilosophyGeneral ReferenceLinguistics

ISBN10: 1793622671
ISBN13: 9781793622679
Publisher: Lexington Books
Published: Nov 22 2021
Pages: 212
Weight: 1.06
Height: 0.63 Width: 6.00 Depth: 9.00
Language: English
Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements engages three philosophical topics and the relationships among them. Filippo Ferrari first contributes to the debate on the nature and normative significance of disagreement, especially in relation to evaluative judgements such as judgements about basic taste, refined aesthetics, and moral matters. Second, he addresses the issue of epistemic normativity, focusing in particular on the normative function(s) that truth exerts on judgements. Third, he contributes to the debate on truth--more specifically, which account of the nature of truth best accommodates the norms relating judgements and truth. This book develops and defends a novel pluralistic picture of the normativity of truth: normative alethic pluralism (NAP). At the core of NAP is the idea that truth exerts different normative functions in relation to different areas of inquiry. Ferrari argues that this picture of the normativity of truth offers the best explanation of the variable normative significance that disagreement exhibits in relation to different subject matters--from a rather shallow normative impact in the case of disagreement about taste, to a normatively more substantive significance in relation to moral judgements. Last, Ferrari defends the view that NAP does not require a commitment to truth pluralism, since it is fully compatible with a somewhat refined version of minimalism about truth.

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