Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley door pickup 10am - 7pm 3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611

  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information

The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information

Meister, Helmut

Paperback

Series: Lecture Notes in Economic and Mathematical Systems, Book 295

EconomicsGeneral GardeningGeneral Mathematics

ISBN10: 3540184295
ISBN13: 9783540184294
Publisher: Springer Nature
Published: Oct 21 1987
Pages: 127
Weight: 0.52
Height: 0.30 Width: 6.69 Depth: 9.61
Language: English
The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.

Also in

Economics

View All