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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Making The (Right) Connections: A Cautionary Account Of WMD Intelligence

Making The (Right) Connections: A Cautionary Account Of WMD Intelligence

Tuten, Charles

Paperback

General European HistoryRussian HistoryWeapons of Mass Destruction

ISBN10: 1881625222
ISBN13: 9781881625223
Publisher: Running End Ltd
Published: Jan 1 2005
Pages: 28
Weight: 0.26
Height: 0.07 Width: 8.50 Depth: 11.00
Language: English

Making The (Right) Connections: A Cautionary Account Of WMD Intelligence


Can an intelligence service find hidden weapons of mass destruction if it doesn't recognize WMD in plain sight?


This hard-hitting monograph, exploiting recent declassification of Cold War materials, presents a timely case study of US intelligence performance. Presenting details of intelligence analysis at work, illustrating realities of inquiry, the convolutions and uncertainties, the known, the missed, the forgotten. Intelligence mirage and reality are contrasted, with the intricate array of made, mishandled, and missed connections providing the unifying theme. The monograph constitutes an intelligence report, reassessing evidence to reach a new conclusion unnoticed by contemporaries, and revealed here for the first time. Intelligence outcomes during missile crises of the late 1950s- early 1960s, and 1980s, are examined and contrasted in this insider's account. Deployments of Soviet long-range nuclear missiles to the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) targeted critical American and NATO assets in Britain, West Germany, Spain, as well as in other European countries (in the first crisis, undetected by Western intelligence services). The account will alter the historical perspective of US intelligence success regarding the October 1962 Cuban missile confrontation. Intelligence misconstruing of information from a key agent, Soviet officer Oleg Penkovsky, is noteworthy. Imagery, clandestine source reporting, and recent Russian revelations are meshed to provide a revised picture of events. The account imparts caveats for

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