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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Predictive Intelligence

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Predictive Intelligence

Thaden, Russell H.

Paperback

Armed ForcesMilitary Strategy

ISBN10: 1288273703
ISBN13: 9781288273706
Publisher: Biblioscholar
Published: Nov 9 2012
Pages: 48
Weight: 0.18
Height: 0.10 Width: 6.14 Depth: 9.21
Language: English

This monograph examines the ability of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to provide predictive intelligence. IPB is the foundation of tactical intelligence and plays a major role in tactical planning prior to the battle. There is a strong expectation that IPB will provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. Current intelligence doctrine supports the proposition that IPB can determine the most probable enemy course of action. The question this study seeks to answer is whether or not IPB does provide the basis to predict enemy courses of action. First the doctrinal IPB process is discussed to show how it arrives at a determination of the most probable enemy course of action. The IPB process focuses on the effects of terrain and weather on the battlefield together with enemy tactical doctrine to arrive at a conclusion. During this process a number of assumptions are made which have a major impact on the validity of the analysis. These assumptions tend to be implicit rather than explicit so that the tactical decision maker may be unaware of their impact on the conclusions drawn from the IPB. Next the monograph examines the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, the Soviet Byelorussian offensive in June and July 1944, and the Soviet Manchurian offensive of August 1945. Each case provides evidence about the difficulty of predicting enemy courses of action based on the factors that IPB considers. An analysis of these cases shows that, in each, extensive knowledge of enemy doctrine based on actual combat experience was inadequate to predict enemy courses of action. Once a specific course of action was forecast, subsequent intelligence collection tended to confirm that conclusion. Even the most sophisticated intelligence means did not provide strong enough evidence to cause analysts and tactical commanders to see other possible enemy courses of action. Finally, this study concludes that there is an important role for IPB to play in providing a tool

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