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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Friction of Joint Information Operations

Friction of Joint Information Operations

Eassa, Charles N.

Paperback

Technology & EngineeringGeneral Political ScienceMilitary Strategy

ISBN10: 1288251327
ISBN13: 9781288251322
Publisher: Biblioscholar
Published: Nov 9 2012
Pages: 52
Weight: 0.19
Height: 0.11 Width: 6.14 Depth: 9.21
Language: English

Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations was published in 1998 to provide clarity and guidance for conducting joint information operations. This paper seeks to answer if the doctrine proved sufficient at the Joint Task Force Level. The formation of Joint Task Forces is normally done under time constraints and with limited resources. Joint information operations doctrine must provide a framework that enables a common understanding and approach to its integration with other capabilities the JTF will employ. Outlining information's role throughout the levels of war and the requirement for information at the JTF level, this paper uses the hierarchy established by previous keystone joint publications to determine if the joint information operations doctrine expanded on the established framework. During this process, the friction caused by the focus of Joint Publication 3-13 is contrasted against the hierarchical joint doctrine. The study concludes that Joint Publication 3-13 represents a new and very complex arena within joint doctrine. Driven by the lure of technology as a substitute for common understanding of operational art, it is not sufficient but serves a starting point for the continued enhancement of the doctrine for better facilitation. Joint Publication 3-13 created a great deal of friction. The publication did not sufficiently clarify the role or the value of information across the spectrum of conflict. It did not link the national instrument of power called information to military information operations to provide unity of effort. There was no discussion expanding the fundamentals of operational art from the joint information operations perspective. Technically oriented, Joint Publication 3-13 did not provide guidance for JTF Commanders to include information operations in their intent statements, concept of operations, or commander's critical information requirements. These omissions contribute to the friction of integrating inform

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