• Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Describing Inner Experience?: Proponent Meets Skeptic

Describing Inner Experience?: Proponent Meets Skeptic

Paperback

Series: Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psycholog

PhilosophyGeneral Psychology

ISBN10: 0262516497
ISBN13: 9780262516495
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: Aug 19 2011
Pages: 336
Weight: 0.85
Height: 0.60 Width: 5.70 Depth: 8.60
Language: English
A psychologist and a philosopher with opposing viewpoints discuss the extent to which it is possible to report accurately on our own conscious experience, considering both the reliability of introspection in general and the particular self-reported inner experiences of Melanie, a subject interviewed using the Descriptive Experience Sampling method.

Can conscious experience be described accurately? Can we give reliable accounts of our sensory experiences and pains, our inner speech and imagery, our felt emotions? The question is central not only to our humanistic understanding of who we are but also to the burgeoning scientific field of consciousness studies. The two authors of Describing Inner Experience disagree on the answer: Russell Hurlburt, a psychologist, argues that improved methods of introspective reporting make accurate accounts of inner experience possible; Eric Schwitzgebel, a philosopher, believes that any introspective reporting is inevitably prone to error. In this book the two discuss to what extent it is possible to describe our inner experience accurately.

Also in

Philosophy