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    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
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The Completeness of Scientific Theories: On the Derivation of Empirical Indicators Within a Theoretical Framework: The Case of Physical Geometry

The Completeness of Scientific Theories: On the Derivation of Empirical Indicators Within a Theoretical Framework: The Case of Physical Geometry

Carrier, Martin

Hardcover

Series: The Western Ontario Philosophy of Science, Book 53

PhilosophyPhysics

ISBN10: 0792324757
ISBN13: 9780792324751
Publisher: Springer
Published: Nov 30 1993
Pages: 278
Weight: 1.31
Height: 0.69 Width: 6.14 Depth: 9.21
Language: English
Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2 Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order to explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory: md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept- ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe.

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