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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players

Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players

Rapoport, A.
Kahan, J. P.
Funk, S. G.

Paperback

Series: Lecture Notes in Economic and Mathematical Systems, Book 169

Economics

ISBN10: 3540092498
ISBN13: 9783540092490
Publisher: Springer
Published: May 1 1979
Pages: 170
Weight: 0.67
Height: 0.39 Width: 6.69 Depth: 9.61
Language: English
The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from rational players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici- pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub- jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis.

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