Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley door pickup 10am - 7pm 3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611

  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There: The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan, 1979-1989

We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There: The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan, 1979-1989

Matthews, Matt

Paperback

General Asian HistoryGeneral Political Science

ISBN10: 1288382804
ISBN13: 9781288382804
Publisher: Bibliogov
Published: Nov 30 2012
Pages: 90
Weight: 0.39
Height: 0.19 Width: 7.44 Depth: 9.69
Language: English
Forward by Dr. William G. Robertson: The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present its latest publication in the Occasional Paper Series, We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There The Soviet Approach in Afghanistan,1979-1989, by Mr. Matt Matthews. For this work, Mr. Matthews collected a wide variety of sources on the subject, many of them of primary accounts, and used these materials to provide an overview of the evolution of the Soviet operational approach in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. This Soviet experience offers a number of useful insights for American military professionals who are, as of this writing, conducting operations in Afghanistan. Mr. Matthews begins his study by examining the Soviets'; planning for its invasion of Afghanistan and initial goals for that campaign. The author then looks closely at how the Soviets adapted their tactics and organization to meet the committed and resilient insurgent threat that emerged to do battle against Soviet forces. Despite conventional interpretations of this campaign in Afghanistan which emphasize the rigidity of Soviet methods, Matthews'; study suggests that the Soviets were flexible in their overall approach. The Soviet government did, for example, launch nation-building initiatives that would look familiar to American military officers who served in Afghanistan in the first decade of the 21st century. These efforts, however, were seriously hindered by a Soviet military culture that opposed a more comprehensive campaign to foster a popular central Afghan government. Matthews concludes his study by examining Soviet operations to extract their forces from Afghanistan while nonetheless leaving a viable, if not popular, Afghan government in place.

1 different editions

Also available

Also in

General Asian History

View All