Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley door pickup 10am - 7pm 3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611

  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations

The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations

Drezner, Daniel W.
Smith, Steve
Biersteker, Thomas J.

Hardcover

Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Book 65

International Relations

ISBN10: 0521643325
ISBN13: 9780521643320
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: Aug 26 1999
Pages: 364
Weight: 1.44
Height: 0.81 Width: 6.00 Depth: 9.00
Language: English
The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.

Also in

International Relations

View All