• Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Principal-Agent Models of CEO Pay-For-Performance Relationships

Principal-Agent Models of CEO Pay-For-Performance Relationships

Paperback

General Political Science

ISBN10: 1288632592
ISBN13: 9781288632596
Publisher: Bibliogov
Published: Jan 21 2013
Pages: 46
Weight: 0.22
Height: 0.10 Width: 7.44 Depth: 9.69
Language: English
I estimate CEO pay-for-performance schedules for two purposes. First, the predictions of several agency and sorting models are tested. Second, the validity of a common observation/complaint about CEO compensation policies is examined. The principal empirical finding is that CEOs of firms that are prone to high (stock-market) performance volatility receive compensation schedules that lie entirely above the schedules of other CEOs. This shows that the high levels of pay cannot be compensation for bearing more risk. Hazard models show CEOs of high volatility firms also have lower probabilities of turnover.

Also in

General Political Science