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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?: Three Monographs from the School of Advanced Military Studies

Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?: Three Monographs from the School of Advanced Military Studies

Bruscino, Thomas
Cox, Dan G.

Paperback

Armed ForcesInternational RelationsPersian Gulf War (1991)

ISBN10: 1470108402
ISBN13: 9781470108403
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Published: Jun 1 2011
Pages: 138
Weight: 0.57
Height: 0.30 Width: 7.44 Depth: 9.69
Language: English
Rarely is it a good idea for any field of human endeavor to be dominated by a single theory aimed at addressing a pressing problem. However, such dominance has recently occurred in the American approach to counterinsurgency warfare. In recent years, driven by the perceived failures in the American war in Iraq, the United States military, and in particular the United States Army, has determined that when it comes to counterinsurgency, the population-centric approach is the only way to go. The population-centric approach dominates the Army's capstone manual on Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, a document published in late 2006 in order to help redress shortcomings in fighting the war in Iraq.1 The driving force behind the manual, General David Petraeus, took the principles contained therein with him to Iraq, applied them during the famous surge of 2007-2008, and ultimately turned that war around. According to this popular account, the population-centric approach had been vindicated, and it became something of received truth about how to prosecute counterinsurgency.

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