The Philosophy of Spinoza as Contained in the First, Second, and Fifth Parts of the "Ethics" and in Extracts from the Third and Fourth
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ISBN10: 1150189398
ISBN13: 9781150189395
Publisher: General Books
Pages: 186
Weight: 0.62
Height: 0.42 Width: 9.01 Depth: 5.98
Language: English
ISBN13: 9781150189395
Publisher: General Books
Pages: 186
Weight: 0.62
Height: 0.42 Width: 9.01 Depth: 5.98
Language: English
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1894 edition. Excerpt: ...man. (See note to prop. 8, and IV, axiom.--Tr.) fSee IV, App. XXX, note.--Tr. X The force and growth of any passion, and its persevering in existence, are not defined by the power with which we endeavor to persevere in existence, but by the power of an external cause as compared with ours. (See JII, def, s. I and 2, and II, 16.--Tr.) of simultaneous causes by which an emotion is aroused, the stronger is the emotion. Q. E. D. Scholium.--This proposition is evident also from axiom 2 of this Part. Prop. 9. An emotion referred to many different causes, which the mind conceives simultaneously with the emotion, is less harmful than another emotion equally great referred to a single cause or to fewer causes: moreover, we are less dominated by it, and regard with less emotion any one cause. Proof.--An emotion is evil or harmful only in so far as it makes the mind less capable of thinking (IV, 26 and 27). Hence an emotion which leads the mind to conceive man/objects simultaneously is less harmful than another emotion equally great, that so holds the mind to the contemplation of a single object or of a few objects that it cannot think of others. This was the first point. In the second place, since the essence of the mind--that is (III, 7), its power--consists in thought alone (II, 11), the mind is less dominated by an emotion that leads it to contemplate many things simultaneously than by an emotion equally great that holds it absorbed in the contemplation of but one object or of a smaller number of objects. This was the second point. In the last place, this emotion (III, 48), f inasmuch as it is referred to many external causes, is less with respect to each one of them. Q. E. D. All that we endeavor to do in obedience to reason is to comprehend; nor does...
