• Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility

Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility

Paperback

International RelationsWeapons of Mass Destruction

ISBN10: 052106399X
ISBN13: 9780521063999
Publisher: Cambridge
Published: Jun 5 2008
Pages: 240
Weight: 0.75
Height: 0.51 Width: 6.14 Depth: 9.21
Language: English
Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

1 different editions

Also available

Also in

Weapons of Mass Destruction