The New York Supplement (Volume 91)

Book may have numerous typos, missing text, images, or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1905. Excerpt: ... into here was in connection with the defendant's purpose in taking the girl. Was it for the purpose of marriage? It is placing the argument on an improper basis to claim that consent of the mother, obtained under false pretenses or by concealment of facts, would be the same as her giving no consent, and that the statute must be construed as requiring a valid consent; that is, a consent by which a contracting party would be bound. The provision of the statute is not open to such construction. We are only dealing with the specific crime of abduction as charged in the indictment, and nothing else. The law has provided for the punishment of the crime of bigamy, and severe penalties are imposed upon the perpetrators of such crimes; and there is a full definition of other phases of the crime of abduction of females under the age of 18 years, and this very subdivision 1 of section 282 of the Penal Code contains one for which the defendant, if he were previously married, might have been indicted. All that is involved in the crime of abduction, in the aspect in which it is now presented, is whether or not consent was obtained. That the defendant was a bigamist or a burglar, or a criminal of any other kind, or even a person of unimpeachable character, can make no difference. We cannot escape the conclusion that the influence of this evidence as to the marriage in Italy upon the minds of the jury, in bringing about a conviction, was irresistible. Whatever his other offense may have been, and however vile his intentions and conduct, the defendant is entitled to be tried only for the offense charged in the indictment. The judgment, therefore, must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. All concur. riOl App. Div. 395) ALECKSON v. ERIE R. CO. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. Fe...