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Manipulating Courts in New Democracies: Forcing Judges Off the Bench in Argentina

Manipulating Courts in New Democracies: Forcing Judges Off the Bench in Argentina

Paperback

Series: Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics

General LawGeneral Political ScienceUnited States Politics

Currently unavailable to order

ISBN10: 0367372037
ISBN13: 9780367372033
Publisher: Routledge
Published: Jul 12 2019
Pages: 140
Language: English

When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? 

Using original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues that in developing democracies the political benefits of manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so. The instability of the political context and its institutions causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control.

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