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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Honing the Dagger: The Formation of a Standing Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters

Honing the Dagger: The Formation of a Standing Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters

Hayes, James E.

Paperback

Armed ForcesInternational Relations

ISBN10: 1288252986
ISBN13: 9781288252985
Publisher: Biblioscholar
Published: Nov 9 2012
Pages: 50
Weight: 0.19
Height: 0.10 Width: 6.14 Depth: 9.21
Language: English

Since the events of September 11th 2001, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has taken the lead in fighting the Global War on Terror. In spite of this new charter, however, USSOCOM continues to conduct operations with antiquated command and control (C2) doctrine and structures. This failure to adapt has greatly hindered the ability of SOF to prosecute the war on terrorism with the necessary efficiency, flexibility and agility. When a Joint Task Force (JTF) is formed, the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) is normally tasked to form a joint special operations task force, or JSOTF, to command and control all special operations forces (SOF) in the JTF. A Joint Force Commander forms this organization on an ad hoc basis, usually cobbled together from the TSOC staff, the regionally oriented Special Forces Group, Naval Special Warfare Task Unit, or some other entity. Consequently, JSOTF staff members face a steep learning curve upon the headquarters' formation, since in all likelihood they will not have trained or worked together before. This ensuing lack of efficiency and cohesion, at least during the initial stages of the JSOTF's formation, causes unnecessary friction and turbulence during the conduct of operations. A likely solution to SOF's command and control dilemma is a standing JSOTF (SJSOTF) headquarters. By forming these headquarters on a permanent basis, U.S. SOF would possess a cohesive, well-trained C2 node free from the organizational and administrative problems associated with ad hoc structures. This monograph explores an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters to the Joint Force Commander. Beginning with a history of joint SOF doctrine, the monograph outlines the evolution of special operations command and control and the subsequent need for a standing operational-level headquarters. Having identified this void in capability, the monograph then presents a model for a SJSOTF headquarters possessing a full-time complemen

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