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The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability After the Cold War

The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability After the Cold War

Paperback

General Military HistoryGeneral World HistoryInternational Relations

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ISBN10: 0773516069
ISBN13: 9780773516069
Publisher: McGill-Queen's University Press
Published: Jul 30 1997
Pages: 208
Language: English

Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future, and the failure of non-proliferation regimes to provide effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past, efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial. The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.

Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This crises-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another.

The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.

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International Relations