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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective

Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective

Myerson, Roger B.

Paperback

General Political ScienceWeapons of Mass Destruction

ISBN10: 1288242239
ISBN13: 9781288242238
Publisher: Bibliogov
Published: Nov 1 2012
Pages: 34
Weight: 0.18
Height: 0.07 Width: 7.44 Depth: 9.69
Language: English
A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.

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