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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918

Experiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918

Callwell, C. E. (Charles Edward)

Paperback

General Military HistoryBritish HistoryWorld War I

Currently unavailable to order

ISBN10: 8072783572
ISBN13: 9788072783571
Publisher: Page of Life
Pages: 246
Weight: 0.74
Height: 0.52 Width: 6.00 Depth: 9.00
Language: English

E xperiences of a Dug-out, 1914-1918 by Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell is a historical account written in the early 20th century. This work narrates the author's firsthand experiences during World War I, particularly focusing on the workings of the War Office and military operations. It is likely that the book provides insight into the challenges faced by military leaders, the state of the British Army, and the organization of wartime logistics as they adapted to the realities of modern warfare. The opening of the book establishes a critical perspective on the War Office's role during the war, tackling the prevalent negative sentiments towards its effectiveness. Callwell refers to the misconceptions that the government and the country held regarding military readiness, asserting that while the army was prepared, the larger strategic planning was lacking. Through observations made during his pre-war visits to German territories and early war experiences, Callwell illustrates the complex dynamics of military operations, highlighting the struggles for efficient communication and decision-making amidst an evolving wartime landscape.T he Tabah incident - The Dardanelles memorandum of 1906 - Special steps takenwith regard to it by SirH. Campbell-Bannerman -Mr. Churchill first raises the question - My conference with him in October 1914 - The naval project against the Straits - Its fundamental errors - Would never have been carried into effect had there been a conference between the Naval War Staff and the General Staff - The bad start - The causes of the final failure on the 18th ofMarch - Lord K.'s instructions to Sir I. Hamilton - The question of the packing of the transports - Sir I. Hamilton's complaint as to there being no plan prepared - The 1906 memorandum - Sir Ian's complaint about insufficient information - How the 1906 memorandum affected this question - Misunderstanding as to the difficulty of obtaining information - The information not in reality so defective - My anxiety at the time of the first landing - The plan, a failure by early in May - Impossibility of sending out reinforcements then - Question whether the delay in sending out reinforcements greatly affected the result in August 1915 - The Dardanelles Committee - Its anxiety - Sir E. Carson and Mr. Churchill, allies - The question

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