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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and Lessons for the Future: Nsiad-93-40

Desert Shield/Storm: Air Mobility Command's Achievements and Lessons for the Future: Nsiad-93-40

U. S. Government Accountability Office (.

Paperback

General Political Science

Publisher Price: $16.75

ISBN10: 1289242585
ISBN13: 9781289242589
Publisher: Bibliogov
Published: Jul 23 2013
Pages: 52
Weight: 0.24
Height: 0.11 Width: 7.44 Depth: 9.69
Language: English
GAO reviewed the Air Mobility Command's (AMC) achievements in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
GAO found that: (1) AMC maintained continuous airlift operations from the United States to Saudi Arabia from the first day of Desert Shield deployment; (2) AMC averaged 65 missions per day from August 7, 1990, to November 1990; (3) AMC averaged 125 missions per day when hostilities began with Desert Storm; (4) AMC access to off-load locations was more limited in the initial months of Desert Shield than expected; (5) large backlogs of sustainment cargo caused legitimate high-priority cargo to be delayed at AMC aerial ports of embarkation; (6) additional off-load locations were made available to AMC through political negotiations and physical improvements to facilities in Saudi Arabia; (7) the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Command sent representatives to major AMC ports of embarkation to reduce the large backlogs and speed the delivery of sustainment cargo; (8) the Central Command's allocation of airlift cargo capacity imposed a degree of discipline on the transportation and supply requisition systems and made field commanders and supply units aware of the limited availability of airlift cargo; (9) AMC required reserve augmentation earlier than envisioned and relied heavily on reserve volunteers for the 3 weeks prior to the presidential call-up due to the lack of an in-theater recovery base; and (10) the Air Force called up its reserves by subunits or skill categories rather than as whole units.

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