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Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups

Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups

Hardcover

General Political Science

ISBN10: 0804735700
ISBN13: 9780804735704
Publisher: Stanford Univ Pr
Published: Jun 1 2000
Pages: 296
Weight: 1.20
Height: 0.95 Width: 6.43 Depth: 9.33
Language: English

Based on the policy-making structures of Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths. Several institutional characteristics have led to a passive legislature and an activist chief executive. The advantages presidents enjoy as a result of their constitutional and partisan powers are demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence, including records of votes of censure, initiation of legislation, and the use of decree authority.

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General Political Science