Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley door pickup 10am - 7pm 3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
A critical assessment of the role of directors in relation to takeovers of public companies

A critical assessment of the role of directors in relation to takeovers of public companies

Böhm, Thomas

Paperback

General Law

ISBN10: 3668964114
ISBN13: 9783668964112
Publisher: Grin Verlag
Published: Aug 30 2019
Pages: 32
Weight: 0.12
Height: 0.08 Width: 5.83 Depth: 8.27
Language: English
Essay from the year 2019 in the subject Law - Civil / Private, Trade, Anti Trust Law, Business Law, grade: A, University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh Law School), course: Company Law, language: English, abstract: Target directors have an ambiguous role in corporate takeovers. On the one hand, once a bid is imminent, they are significantly involved spending most of their time in responding to the bid and advising the shareholders whose interests the directors must primarily represent. On the other hand, they face various potential conflicts of interests as takeovers can have significant personal and professional implications on them. This essay critically assesses the role of directors in relation to takeovers of public companies. Their corporate powers are constrained by a range of rules in the Takeover Code . However, takeover regulation leaves significant room for board discretion which is therefore subject to common law and general company law. As we will see, the target directors only have an advisory role vis-à-vis the shareholders, with the latter taking the ultimate decision on acceptance of the takeover bid. The essay is structured as follows. Section 2 starts by introducing the context of takeovers of public companies followed by a brief summary of common motives for takeovers in section 3. Special emphasis is placed on the effects of the theory of the market for control on directors which at various points had an influence on the takeover regulation. Section 4 then deals with the allocation of the acceptance-decision on a takeover bid to the shareholders. In order not to interfere with this right by taking defensive measures which could frustrate a takeover bid, the Takeover Code has imposed a strict 'no frustration rule' on target directors. This is covered by section 5. Reference will also be made to the respective directors' (fiduciary) duties under common law and company law. Subsequently, section 6 critically discusses the advisory role of the target dir

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