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  • Open Daily: 10am - 10pm
    Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm

    3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
    612-822-4611

Open Daily: 10am - 10pm | Alley-side Pickup: 10am - 7pm
3038 Hennepin Ave Minneapolis, MN
612-822-4611
Auctions as Mechanisms.

Auctions as Mechanisms.

Sigurdsson, Gustav

Paperback

Economics

Currently unavailable to order

ISBN10: 1243456957
ISBN13: 9781243456953
Publisher: Proquest Umi Dissertation Pub
Pages: 70
Weight: 0.35
Height: 0.18 Width: 7.99 Depth: 10.00
Language: English
I introduce a class of new mechanisms which all are straightforward modifications of standard auctions: Instead of keeping the payments she collects from the bidders, the auctioneer returns the proceeds to them according to a particular sharing rule. I show that mechanisms of this kind can implement a wide variety of distributional goals in diverse economic settings without sacrificing efficiency. In the first article, I consider the problem of allocating a single indivisible object efficiently and dividing its value among a group of agents in a particular way. I show that a standard second-price auction in which the proceeds are returned to the bidders allocates the object efficiently and divides its value between the bidders according to the sharing rule. In the second article, I apply my mechanism to the restructuring of a bankrupt firm. Here, the objective is to allocate shares in the reorganized firm in such a way that the priority of pre-bankrupty claims is respected. I show that, by selling the reorganized firm in a share auction in which participants can bid for a fraction of the firm, its value can be divided according to any priority rule under which each creditor's share of total value is strictly increasing in total value. My result holds even when the participants face severe financial constraints. In the third article, I consider an environment with an arbitrary set of social alternatives. Here, each agent submits a menu of bids, one bid for each alternative, and the alternative for which the sum of all agents' bids is highest is chosen. After collecting payments, which are based on the agents' bids, the auctioneer returns them to the agents according to a particular rule. I show that this mechanism implements both the efficient choice of alternative and a wide variety of distributional goals.

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