Military Theory and Strategy
The Art of War
Paperback ISBN: 0143037528
The perfect books for the true book lover, PenguinÂ's Great Ideas series features twelve more groundbreaking works by some of historyÂ's most prodigious thinkers. Each volume is beautifully packaged with a unique type-driven design that highlights the bookmakerÂ's art. Offering great literature in great packages at great prices, this series is ideal for those readers who want to explore and savor the Great Ideas that have shaped our world.
The Mask of Command
Alexander the Great, Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler, and the Nature of Leadership
Paperback ISBN: 0140114068
Examines the leadership styles of Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, General Grant, and Adolf Hitler, and explains how each reflected characteristics of his society
A War of a Different Kind
Military Force and America's Search for Homeland Security
Hardcover ISBN: 1591142202
A former senior Pentagon official examines the political, legal, and practical implications of the use of the military in support of homeland security and in the ongoing war against terrorism. Sample topics include the statute governing the use of military personnel in law enforcement, the constitutional power of the president, and the reorganization of the government to meet the terrorist threat. Written in an accessible style, this meticulously documented volume is suitable for general readers as well as civilian and military leaders. Annotation
The Last Ridge
The Epic Story of America's First Mountain Soldiers and the Assault on Hitler's Europe
Paperback ISBN: 0375759514
A close-up look at the creation of the U.S. Army's first alpine division, made up of some of America's most elite skiers and climbers, describes the evolution of the 10th Mountain Division, and their stunning nighttime mountain attack during the winter of 1945 on seemingly impenetrable German mountain fortifications. Reprint. 17,500 first printing.
Afghanistan And the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare
Hardcover ISBN: 159114745x
Rothstein (defense analysis, US Naval Postgraduate School) analyzes the lessons of the US war in Afghanistan, suggesting that success in overthrowing the Taliban should not obscure the organizational and operational inability of US Special Operations Forces to conduct unconventional warfare against the irregular forces of al-Qaeda. Setting his study within the framework of organizational and contingency theory, he argues that Defense Department structures are ill suited for the organizational innovation required by unconventional warfare. He recommends the creation of a separate unconventional warfare service with a regional and cultural focus that emphasizes language, network analysis, intelligence collection, basic civics, international relations, interagency familiarization, and negotiating skills, in addition to other organizational and cultural changes. Annotation ©2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Victory in War
Foundations of Modern Military Policy
Hardcover ISBN: 0521859565
An examination of the concept of victory in war explores historical definitions, discusses how victory has evolved, and looks at twenty-first century case studies that include U.S. interventions in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Panama.
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
U.s. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5
Paperback ISBN: 0226841510
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
A Genius for Deception
How Cunning Helped the British Win Two World Wars
Hardcover ISBN: 019538704x
In February 1942, intelligence officer Victor Jones erected 150 tents behind British lines in North Africa. "Hiding tanks in Bedouin tents was an old British trick," writes Nicholas Rankin; German general Erwin Rommel not only knew of the ploy, but had copied it himself. Jones knew that Rommel knew. In fact, he counted on it--for these tents were empty. With the deception that he was carrying out a deception, Jones made a weak point look like a trap. In A Genius for Deception, Rankin offers a lively and comprehensive history of how Britain bluffed, tricked, and spied its way to victory in two world wars. As he shows, a coherent program of strategic deception emerged in World War I, resting on the pillars of camouflage, propaganda, secret intelligence, and special forces. All forms of deception found an avid sponsor in Winston Churchill, who carried his enthusiasm for deceiving the enemy into World War II. Rankin vividly recounts such little-known episodes as the invention of camouflage by two French artist-soldiers, the creation of dummy airfields for the Germans to bomb during the Blitz, and the fabrication of an army that would supposedly invade Greece. Strategic deception would be key to a number of WWII battles, culminating in the massive misdirection that proved critical to the success of the D-Day invasion in 1944. Deeply researched and written with an eye for telling detail, A Genius for Deception shows how British used craft and cunning to help win the most devastating wars in human history.