Military Theory and Strategy
Featured Items
Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War
Paths to Peace
Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War
Hardcover      ISBN: 0804762694
A former US Army military intelligence officer, Stanley (security studies, Georgetown U.) uses detailed qualitative case studies and quantitative analysis to test the hypothesis that a change in the ruling coalition of a belligerent country influences the termination of a war the country is pursuing. After setting out the theory, she turns to the 1950-53 war, characterizing the Korean states as powerless players, the Soviet Union as outlasting Stalin's preferences, the US as trapped by the security mindset and voluntary prisoner repatriation, and China as trapped by a hawkish ally. Then she explains the domestic coalitions interacting in bargains for peace. The final section shows how her findings can be demonstrated at work since 1862, and ponders the implications. Annotation
Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently
Navy Strategic Culture
Why the Navy Thinks Differently
Hardcover      ISBN: 1591140242
It is the contention of this book that US Navy-trained officers have better, broader military strategic skills than their counterparts in the Army and Air Force. Why this is, and what implications it has for the defense of the country are explored in detail. To what extent the differences are cultural, or are a result of the fluid nature, literally, of the environment in which the Navy operates, makes the discussion an interesting one. Annotation ©2010 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (
Finishing Business: Ten Steps To Defeat Global Terror
Finishing Business
Ten Steps To Defeat Global Terror
Hardcover      ISBN: 1591149061
Ullman examines the underlying causes and political motivations that drive global terrorism. He analyzes the attraction that Jihadist Extremism holds for disaffected Muslims around the world and argues that American governance is currently not up to the task of keeping the nation safe. He then describes ten concrete steps America can take to defeat global terror. Ullman is a columnist for the Washington Times. Annotation
A Genius for Deception: How Cunning Helped the British Win Two World Wars
A Genius for Deception
How Cunning Helped the British Win Two World Wars
Hardcover      ISBN: 019538704x
In February 1942, intelligence officer Victor Jones erected 150 tents behind British lines in North Africa. "Hiding tanks in Bedouin tents was an old British trick," writes Nicholas Rankin; German general Erwin Rommel not only knew of the ploy, but had copied it himself. Jones knew that Rommel knew. In fact, he counted on it--for these tents were empty. With the deception that he was carrying out a deception, Jones made a weak point look like a trap. In A Genius for Deception, Rankin offers a lively and comprehensive history of how Britain bluffed, tricked, and spied its way to victory in two world wars. As he shows, a coherent program of strategic deception emerged in World War I, resting on the pillars of camouflage, propaganda, secret intelligence, and special forces. All forms of deception found an avid sponsor in Winston Churchill, who carried his enthusiasm for deceiving the enemy into World War II. Rankin vividly recounts such little-known episodes as the invention of camouflage by two French artist-soldiers, the creation of dummy airfields for the Germans to bomb during the Blitz, and the fabrication of an army that would supposedly invade Greece. Strategic deception would be key to a number of WWII battles, culminating in the massive misdirection that proved critical to the success of the D-Day invasion in 1944. Deeply researched and written with an eye for telling detail, A Genius for Deception shows how British used craft and cunning to help win the most devastating wars in human history.
What If?: The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been
What If?
The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been
Paperback      ISBN: 0425176428
Essays by respected military historians, including Stephen Ambrose, David McCullough, James McPherson, and John Keegan, consider the consequences if history had turned out differently, such as if the weather on D-Day had been worse or if Washington had not escaped from Long Island. Reprint.
A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815
A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession
The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815
Hardcover      ISBN: 0870212834
Compiled from official records and unpublished material, the author builds a unique and fascinating social history of the U.S. Navy's officer corps between its establishment in 1794 and the end of the War of 1812.
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle
The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle
Paperback      ISBN: 0140165614
A history of the battle at Guadalcanal draws on first-time translations of official Japanese defense accounts and declassified U.S. radio intelligence to recreate this critical campaign. Reprint. 25,000 first printing. NYT.
The Art of War/The Book Of Lord Shang
The Art of War/The Book Of Lord Shang
by Sun-tzu
Paperback      ISBN: 1853267791
The Art of War
The Art of War
by Sun-Tzu
Paperback      ISBN: 0195014766
An ancient Chinese treatise on war stresses the importance of speed, sound tactics, subterfuge, discipline, appropriate form of attack, and accurate intelligence
Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency
Wrong Turn
America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency
Hardcover      ISBN: 1595588744
"Colonel Gian Gentile's 2008 article "Misreading the Surge" in World Politics Review first exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals that has since been playing out in strategy sessions at the Pentagon, in classrooms at military academies, and on the pages of the New York Times. While the past years of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan have been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts have questioned the necessity and efficacy of COIN--essentially armed nation-building--in achieving the United States' limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author's experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War andhis research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile's views of the failures of COIN, as well as a searing reevaluation of the current state of affairs in Afghanistan.As the issue of America's withdrawal from Afghanistan inevitably rises to the top of the national agenda, Wrong Turn will be a major new touchstone for what went wrong and a vital new guide to the way forward. Note: the ideas in this book are the author's alone, not the Department of Defense's."--